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Abstract
Latency (i.e., time delay) in electronic markets affects the efficacy of liquidity taking strategies.
During the time liquidity takers process information and send marketable limit orders (MLOs) to
the exchange, the limit order book (LOB) might undergo updates, so there is no guarantee that
MLOs are filled. We develop a latency-optimal trading strategy that improves the marksmanship
of liquidity takers. The interaction between the LOB and MLOs is modelled as a marked point
process. Each MLO specifies a price limit so the order can receive worse prices and quantities than
those the liquidity taker targets if the updates in the LOB are against the interest of the trader.
In our model, the liquidity taker balances the tradeoff between missing trades and the costs of
walking the book. We employ techniques of variational analysis to obtain the optimal price limit
of each MLO the agent sends. The price limit of a MLO is characterized as the solution to a new
class of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) driven by random measures.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the FBSDE and numerically solve it to
illustrate the performance of the latency-optimal strategies.
Keywords: Marked point processes, high-frequency trading, algorithmic trading, latency,
forward-backward stochastic differential equations.
1. Introduction
Speed to make decisions and to access the market is a key element in the success of trading
strategies in electronic markets. Liquidity providers monitor and update their limit orders (LOs)
resting in the limit order book (LOB), and liquidity takers send orders that target LOs. The efficacy
of the strategies of the makers and takers of liquidity depends on their latency in the marketplace.
Latency is the time delay between an exchange streaming market data to a trader, the trader
processing information and making a decision, and the exchange receiving the instruction from
the trader. Thus, due to latency, there is no guarantee that liquidity providers can place a LO in
a desired queue position in the book or withdraw a stale quote before it is picked off by another
trader.
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Furthermore, there are no assurances that marketable limit orders (MLOs) from liquidity takers,
which aim at a quantity and price they observed in the LOB, hit the desired target. A MLO is
a liquidity taking order for immediate execution against the LOs resting in the book, and each
MLO specifies the quantity of the security (e.g., equity, currency pairs, futures, etc.) and a price
limit to execute against LOs.1 Due to latency, by the time the exchange processes a MLO, prices
and quantities could have improved, so the order is filled at a better price, or prices and quantities
could have worsened, so the order is filled if the limit price allows, otherwise the order is rejected.
In this paper, we focus on how latency affects the marksmanship of liquidity takers and we
develop a latency-optimal trading strategy that accounts for the time delays in the marketplace.
We frame the interaction between the LOB and MLOs as a marked point process (MPP). In our
model, the agent sends buy/sell MLOs at random times to partly camouflage her order flow, and
before the order reaches the exchange, the LOB undergoes quantity and price updates. We assume
the agent sends fill-or-kill MLOs, that is, the orders are either filled in full or rejected.2 The price
limit of the MLO consists of the best quote the agent observes at the time she decides to trade
and a discretion to walk the LOB.
The LOB is a moving target, so liquidity takers hit or miss the LOs they are attempting to
execute. Everything else being the same, the chances of filling a MLO increase if the agent is willing
to receive quantities and prices that are worse than those of the best quotes the agent observes in
the LOB when she decides to trade. If the discretion to walk the book is unlimited, the MLO will
be filled, but potentially at much worse prices than those of the best quotes the agent observed.
On the other hand, if the updates in the LOB are in the interest of the agent, the MLO will be
filled at better prices than those of the LOs that the agent targeted.
In our model, the agent balances the tradeoff between missing trades and the costs from walking
the LOB over a trading window (e.g., minutes, hours, days, etc.). For each liquidity taking order,
the strategy optimizes the discretion of the MLO, while it penalizes both the number of missed
trades and the costs accrued to the strategy over the trading horizon. We employ techniques
of variational analysis to obtain the optimal discretion for each MLO the agent sends, which we
characterize as the solution to a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). We
show existence and uniqueness of the solution to the forward and backward parts of the FBSDE and
show existence and uniqueness of the solution to the full FBSDE. To the best of our knowledge,
uniqueness and existence of the resulting random-measure driven FBSDE is not covered in the
extant literature, and the particular form itself appears to be new.
In the agent’s performance criterion, when the penalty for missing trades is linear in the ex-
pected number of rejected trades, we obtain the optimal strategy in closed-form – the latency-
optimal strategy consists of sending all MLOs with a fixed discretion. When the penalty for missing
trades is quadratic in the expected number of rejected trades, we solve the FBSDE numerically. We
illustrate the performance of the latency-optimal strategies for a range of model parameters and
examine the tradeoff between costs from walking the book and number of missed trades. Finally,
we discuss strategies that are cost-neutral to the agent. That is, the latency-optimal strategy is
devised so the expected costs from walking the book to fill MLOs when the LOB moves against the
agent’s interests is the same as the expected benefits (i.e., negative costs) from executing trades at
1A marketable order and a market order differ in that the marketable limit order walks the LOB until it reaches
the limit price specified by the trader, while a market order walks the LOB until it is filled in full.
2This is in contrast to an immediate-or-cancel order, which has the property that the order can be partially filled
if there is liquidity in the LOB that meets the requirements of the MLO. The unfilled portion of the order is rejected.
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better prices than the ones the agent targets.
Several authors address various aspects of latency in electronic markets. Moallemi and Sagˆlam
(2013) look at the cost of latency for liquidity takers in equity markets. They compare the costs
of liquidating one stock with and without time delays in the marketplace to compute the cost of
latency. The work of Stoikov and Waeber (2016) shows how to execute a large order in electronic
markets by employing the volume imbalance of the LOB to predict price changes and study the
effect of latency in the efficacy of the execution strategy. Lehalle and Mounjid (2017) employ data
from Nasdaq-Omx and also find that as latency increases, the informational content in the volumes
of the LOB diminishes.
Cartea and Sa´nchez-Betancourt (2018) employ proprietary foreign exchange data to show how
latency and volatility of the midprice of the security affect the fill ratio of liquidity taking strategies.
The authors show how traders could employ latency-optimal strategies to improve fill ratios, while
minimizing costs, and they show how to compute the shadow price of latency in foreign exchange
markets. Gao and Wang (2018) use Markov decision processes to model the problem of a market
maker with latency who trades in a LOB, where the size of the quoted spread is always one tick.
The authors find that as latency increases, the profits from making markets decrease.
Recent literature on high-frequency trading and algorithmic trading discusses various charac-
teristics of trading and how traders use speed to obtain informational advantages, see e.g., Lehalle
and Laruelle (2013). Other strands of the literature discuss the relationship of market quality, the
speed of market participants, and stochastic liquidity, see for example Almgren (2012) and Gue´ant
(2016) for trading in illiquid markets. Barger and Lorig (2019) model the rapid updates of the best
quotes in the LOB to propose a model of stochastic price impact.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes the agent’s performance
criterion and characterizes the latency-optimal strategy as the solution to a FBSDE. Section 3
shows existence and uniqueness of the solution of the forward and backward part of the FBSDE,
and existence and uniqueness of the solution to the full FBSDE. Section 4 shows that the candidate
control we find is the global optimum and Section 5 discusses the performance of the strategy for
various scenarios. We conclude in Section 6 and collect some proofs in the Appendix.
2. Optimal discretion to walk the book
2.1. Latency: the LOB as a moving target
Liquidity takers in electronic markets face a moving target problem. Traders send orders that
target a price and quantity they observe in the LOB, but due to latency, when the order arrives
in the exchange, the target could have moved. If prices and quantities worsen, the agent’s order is
rejected, and if prices and quantities improve or do not worsen, the order is filled.
We frame the moving target problem as a MPP N = {(Tn, Zn)}(n≥1) in the probability space
(Ω, F , P). Here, (Tn) is an increasing sequence of random points in (0, T ]
⋃{∞}, which represent
the times when the agent sends MLOs to the exchange, and (Zn) is a sequence of marks, which
represent the shock to the average price per share due to changes in prices and quantities.
We assume that each order is for one unit of the security or for a lot of securities, where the lots
have a fixed size throughout the trading horizon. When the volume of the MLO is in lots of the
security, the mark Z represents a shock to the LOB commensurate with the volume of the MLO.
As in Confortola et al. (2016), we define the sample space to be Ω =
⋃
n{Tn > T}, where
T ∈ (0,∞) denotes a fixed time horizon. The filtration (Ft)t≥0 is generated by N and is the
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smallest filtration such that for each n, the point Tn is a stopping time and the mark Zn is FTn-
measurable. We use predictable processes to mean the left-continuous version of a process, see
Theorem 7.2.4 in Cohen and Elliott (2015).
The random measure associated with N is
p(dt,dz) =
∑
n≥1:Tn≤T
D(Tn,Zn)(dt,dz) ,
where D denotes the Dirac measure, and we assume that
E
[
(p ([0, T ], R))2
]
<∞ and E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
|z| p(dz, dt)
]
<∞ . (1)
We denote by p˜ the predictable compensator of the random measure p, which admits the
following decomposition
p˜(dz,dt) = φt(dz) dAt . (2)
Here, the compensator has the property that for q := p− p˜ and any integrable and predictable pro-
cess H, the stochastic integral (H ? q)t =
∫ t
0
∫
RHs q(ds, dz) is a martingale. In (2), the predictable
process (At)t∈T, where T := [0, T ], is the compensator of the counting process of the MLOs, which
we denote by Nt := p([0, t]× R).
Assumption 1. The process A admits a bounded stochastic intensity so that we may write At =∫ t
0 λu du for a predictable process (λt)t∈T and ∃ λ¯ ∈ R, such that ∀ (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, λt(ω) ≤ λ¯.
The density function of the marks is φt, which has support in R and is bounded, and its
cumulative distribution function is Φt, which we assume is uniformly Lipchitz in [0, T ] × Ω with
Lipschitz constant k.
Let (δt)t∈T be a predictable process that specifies the cash per unit of the security (or lots of
the security) the agent is willing to walk the LOB to increase the chances of filling her liquidity
taking order, i.e., δ is the discretion of the MLO. For example, in equity markets, if the agent sends
a buy order to lift the offer at the best ask at, the discretionary amount δt is the extra cash per
share the order may walk the book, i.e., at + δt is the highest price the agent is willing to pay for
one share of equity. Similarly, if the agent sends a sell order to hit the best bid bt, the amount δt is
the cash discount per share the order may walk the book, i.e., bt − δt is the lowest price the agent
is willing to accept to sell one share of equity.
In the examples above, the best bid and best ask prices (bt and at) refer to those the agent
‘observes’ when she decides to trade, but due to latency, these prices could be stale. In addition,
by the time the exchange processes the order of the agent, prices and quantities in the LOB could
have borne further updates. Price changes could be against or in favour of the agent’s interest.
When the price per unit of the security moves against the interest of the agent, the order is filled
only if the discretion δ of the MLO is enough to cover the adverse change in price and quantity;
we refer to this as a price deterioration. On the other hand, if the price per unit of the security
moves in favour of the agent’s trade interest, the order is filled at a better price; we refer to this
as a price improvement
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2.2. Tradeoff: cost of walking the LOB and missed trades
The agent must balance the costs of walking the LOB against the number of missed trades as
a consequence of her latency in the marketplace. Clearly, if the agent sends orders with infinite
discretion to walk the LOB, all orders are filled (we rule out cases in which the LOB is empty) and
the costs accrued from walking the LOB are expected to be highest. On the other hand, everything
else being equal, lowering discretion, lowers the strategy’s cost but increases the number of missed
trades.
We discuss the cost for MLOs with volume equal to one unit of the security – the costs for
MLOs where volume is in lots of the security are computed in a similar way. For buy orders, the
cost of the strategy is the cash the agent pays for the security minus the price on the offer side
of the LOB that the agent targets. Similarly, for sell orders, the cost of the strategy is the target
price in the bid side of the LOB minus the cash received for the security. That is, the cost of the
strategy is the extra cash paid to walk the LOB, which is zero if the order is not executed. We
denote the controlled cost process by Cδ = (Cδ)t∈T and
Cδt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
z Gˆ(δs − z) p(dz, ds) , (3)
where Gˆ(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and Gˆ(x) = 0 otherwise.
The extra cost for each filled trade is z Gˆ(δs − z), which can be negative (price improvement),
positive (price deterioration), or zero. This cost is negative when the shock to the LOB is negative
(z < 0), in which case the order is filled at a better price than that targeted by the agent – the price
improvement is |z|. On the other hand, this cost is positive when the shock to the LOB is positive
(z > 0), in which case the order is filled (because δ ≥ z) at a worse price than that targeted by
the agent – the price deterioration is z. Finally, when the shock to the LOB is zero (z = 0) or the
trade is missed, the cost is zero.
The process Dδ = (Dδt )t∈T denotes the controlled number of misses and
Dδt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G (δs − z) p(dz, ds) , (4)
where G(x) = 1 − Gˆ(x). Recall that the MLO is for one unit of the security or for lots of the
security, which are of fixed size throughout the trading horizon. In the latter case, the number of
misses is in lots of the security.
2.3. Performance criterion
The agent’s performance criterion is
J(δ) = E
[
CδT + αD
δ
T + γ
(
DδT
)2]
, (5)
where both α ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are penalty parameters for the total number of missed trades, and
the set of admissible strategies is
A :=
{
δ = (δt)t∈T
∣∣∣∣δ is F − predictable and E [sup
t∈T
(δt)
2
]
< ∞
}
. (6)
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The agent wishes to find a control δ∗ ∈ A that minimizes the performance criterion (5), that is,
the agent solves the problem
δ∗ = argmin
δ∈A
J(δ) .
Note that J(δ) <∞ because G ≤ 1 and (1) holds. We choose the units of the parameters α, γ, so
that the performance criterion has the same units as those of the costs C.
In the performance criterion, the penalties for missing trades are not financial costs. Everything
else being equal, an increase in the value of the penalty parameters makes the strategy post orders
with higher discretion to walk the LOB. In the extreme case where one of the penalty parameters
is arbitrarily large, the optimal strategy is to post orders with discretion to walk the LOB as deep
as necessary to fill the trades, i.e., the MLO with infinite discretion is a market order.
2.4. Variational Analysis Approach
We employ techniques of variational analysis to obtain the optimal discretion strategy. For
ease of presentation, we write
J(δ) = JC(δ) + αJLP(δ) + γ JQP(δ) , (7)
where JC(δ) = E
[
CδT
]
, JLP(δ) = E
[
DδT
]
, and JQP(δ) = E
[(
DδT
)2]
.
Next, note that
JC(δ) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
z Gˆ(δt − z) p(dz, ds)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
z Gˆ(δt − z)φt(dz) dAt
]
, (8)
and the next proposition provides expressions for JLP (δ) and JQP (δ).
Proposition 1. The following equations hold
JLP(δ) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt − z) p˜(dz, dt)
]
, (9)
JQP(δ) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
2Dδt− G(δt − z) +G(δt − z)
)
p˜(dz, dt)
]
. (10)
Proof. Equation (9) follows from the predictability of the integrand. Next, we show (10). The
number of missed trades Dδt satisfy the SDE
dDδt =
∫
R
G(δt − z) p(dz, dt) .
Let h(x) = x2 and use an integration formula (see Jeanblanc et al. (2009)) to write
dh(Dδt ) =
∫
R
(
h
(
Dδt− +G (δt − z)
)
− h
(
Dδt−
))
p(dz, dt) .
Then,
d
(
Dδt
)2
=
∫
R
(
2Dδt− G(δt − z) +G2(δt − z)
)
p(dz, dt)
=
∫
R
(
2Dδt− G(δt − z) +G(δt − z)
)
p(dz, dt) ,
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where the second equality holds because G2 = G. Integrate from zero to T , take expectations, and
because the integrand 2Dδt− G(δt − z) +G(δt − z) is predictable, obtain
E
[(
DδT
)2]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
2Dδt− G(δt − z) +G(δt − z)
)
p(dz, dt)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
2Dδt− G(δt − z) +G(δt − z)
)
p˜(dz, dt)
]
.
2.4.1. Optimal discretion to walk the LOB
We employ Gaˆteaux derivatives to obtain the latency-optimal strategy that minimizes the
performance criterion of the agent. Let w, δ ∈ A. The directional derivative of J at δ in the
direction of w is given by
〈D J(δ), w〉 = lim
→0
1
 [J(δ + w)− J(δ)] , (11)
when the limit exists. Now, letA′ be the dual space ofA. If there is A′ ∈ A′ such that 〈D J(δ), w〉 =
A′(w) for all w ∈ A, then A′ is called the Gaˆteaux derivative of J at δ. In this paper, the directional
derivatives are elements of the dual of A, hence we refer to the directional derivatives as Gaˆteaux
derivatives. Note that it is trivial to show that A is a linear space over R.
Lemma 1. The Gaˆteaux derivative at δ ∈ A in the direction w ∈ A of the:
(a) cost functional JC is
〈D JC(δ), w〉 = E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt) δt dAt
]
;
(b) linear penalty functional JLP is
〈D JLP(δ), w〉 = −E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt) dAt
]
;
(c) quadratic penalty functional JQP is
〈D JQP(δ), w〉 = −2E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z′) p˜(dz′, ds)
]
dAt
]
− 2E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)D
δ
t− dAt
]
− E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt) dAt
]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The next theorem provides the Gaˆteaux derivative of the performance criterion of the agent
and provides a characterization of the optimal discretion to walk the LOB.
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Theorem 1. The Gaˆteaux derivative of the functional J at δ ∈ A in the direction of w ∈ A is
〈D J(δ), w〉 = E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)
(
δt − 2 γ Dδt− − γ − α− 2 γ Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z′) p˜(dz′, ds)
])
dAt
]
,
and vanishes in every direction w ∈ A if and only if there is a process δ∗ ∈ A such that
δ∗t = 2 γ Et−
[
Dδ
∗
T
]
+ γ + α , (12)
almost everywhere in T× Ω.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and the performance criterion (7), the Gaˆteaux derivative of J vanishes at
δ∗t = 2 γ Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δ∗s − z′) p˜(dz′, ds)
]
+ 2 γ
(
Dδ
∗
t− +
1
2
)
+ α
= 2 γ Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δ∗s − z′) p(dz′, ds)
]
+ 2 γ
(
Dδ
∗
t− +
1
2
)
+ α
= 2 γ Et−
[
Dδ
∗
T −Dδ
∗
t−
]
+ 2 γ
(
Dδ
∗
t− +
1
2
)
+ α
= 2 γ Et−
[
Dδ
∗
T
]
+ γ + α . (13)
Now we show that if the Gaˆteaux derivative at δ vanishes in every direction w, the control δ satisfies
(13). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists δˆ ∈ A such that 〈D J(δˆ), w〉 = 0 for all
w ∈ A and there is (T, O) ∈ B(T)×FT with L(T)P(O) > 0 such that δˆt(ω) 6= δ∗t (ω) for t ∈ T, and
ω ∈ O, where L(T) denote the Lebesgue measure of T ∈ B(T), and B(T) is the Borel sigma-algebra
of T. Thus, on T×O we have
δˆt(ω)− 2 γ Et−
[
DδˆT
]
(ω)− γ − α 6= 0 .
Hence, wt = δˆt − 2 γ Et− [DδˆT ] − γ − α is predictable and E[supt∈T(wt)2] < ∞. Furthermore, the
Gaˆteaux derivative of δˆ in the direction of w satisfies the inequality 〈D J(δˆ), w〉 > 0, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, there is no (T, O) ∈ B(T)×F with L(T)P(O) > 0 such that δˆt(ω) 6= δ∗t (ω)
for t ∈ T and ω ∈ O.
If the value of the quadratic penalty parameter γ is zero, the candidate optimal control in (12)
has the simple closed-form expression
δ∗t = α , (14)
which is independent of the number of missed trades. Thus, for γ = 0 the agent sends all MLOs
with discretion α to walk the LOB.
3. Existence and Uniqueness of the FBSDE
To the best of our knowledge, the FBSDE in (12) is a new class of random measure driven
FBSDEs, and there are no uniqueness or existence results in the extant literature. Therefore, in
this section we prove existence and uniqueness of the solution of the FBSDE. For FBSDEs in a
8
semimartingale setting see Antonelli (1993). For fully coupled FBSDEs in the Brownian motion case
see Peng and Wu (1999). For an account of Brownian motion and Poisson processes in FBSDEs,
see Zhen (1999). Jianming (2000), Confortola and Fuhrman (2013), Confortola et al. (2016), and
Bandini (2016) study the framework of BSDEs and MPPs. For the study of FBSDEs that arise from
vanishing Gaˆteaux derivatives in stochastic games stemming from algorithmic trading problems,
see Casgrain and Jaimungal (2018b) and Casgrain and Jaimungal (2018a).
To streamline the results in this section, we start with a lemma that is useful to prove existence
and uniqueness of the solution to the FBSDE (12).
Lemma 2. Let
C :=
{
U = (Ut)t∈T
∣∣∣∣U is F − adapted & E [sup
t∈T
(Ut)
2
]
< ∞
}
.
The spaces (A, ‖·‖∞), (A, ‖·‖), (C, ‖·‖∞), and (C, ‖·‖) are Banach spaces, where
‖δ‖∞ = E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt|
]
and ‖δ‖ = E
[∫ T
0
|δt| dt
]
.
Proof. We prove the results for the set A – the proof for the set C is similar.
The predictable class of processes is closed in the space of finite processes with norm ‖·‖∞
(resp. ‖·‖), which we denote by L∞ (resp. L1). Then the space (A, ‖·‖∞) (resp. (A, ‖·‖)) is a
linear closed subspace of L∞ (resp. L1), which is a Banach space and (A, ‖·‖∞) (resp. (A, ‖·‖)) is
also a Banach space.
Corollary 1. The space C × C with norm
‖(U, V )‖C×C = ‖U‖C + ‖V ‖C , where ‖U‖C = E
[∫ T
0
|Us| ds
]
and (U, V ) ∈ C × C, is a Banach space.
By means of the change of variables δ˜t = δ
∗
t + 2 γ D
δ∗
t , we have that a solution to the FBSDE
δt = 2 γ Et−
[
DδT
]
+ γ + α , (15)
Dδt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(δs − z) p(dz,ds) , Dδ0 = 0 ,
with δ ∈ A and D ∈ C, exists and is unique, if and only if a solution to the FBSDE
δ˜t = 2 γ Et
[
Dδ˜T −Dδ˜t
]
+ γ + α , (16)
Dδ˜t =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(δ˜s− + 2 γ D
δ˜
s− − z) p(dz, ds) , Dδ˜0 = 0 ,
with δ˜, Dδ˜ ∈ C, exists and is unique. We write (16) as
δ˜t = 2 γ Et
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δ˜s− + 2 γ D
δ˜
s− − z) p(dz,ds)
]
+ γ + α , (17)
Dδ˜t =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(δ˜s− + 2 γ D
δ˜
s− − z) p(dz,ds) , Dδ˜0 = 0 .
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To analyse solutions to the FBSDE (17), we study the fixed points of the functional
Υ(U, V )t =
(
H(U, V )t
I(U, V ))t
)
=
(
2 γ Et
[∫ T
t
∫
RG(Us− + 2 γ Vs− − z) p(dz, ds)
]
+ γ + α∫ t
0
∫
RG(Us− + 2 γ Vs− − z) p(dz,ds)
)
, (18)
and, for completeness, prove existence and uniqueness of the solution of: (i) the backward part
of the FBSDE; (ii) the forward part of the FBSDE; and (iii) the full FBSDE – a result which we
derive independently from the existence of the backward and forward parts of the FBSDE.
The following theorem shows the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the backward part
of the FBSDE (17).
Theorem 2. Fix V ∈ C. Let the cumulative distribution function Φ be Lipschitz with constant
k, and let λ¯ be the upper bound of the stochastic intensity λ in Assumption 1. The functional
Ψ : C → C given by
Ψ(U)t = 2 γ Et
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(Us− + 2 γ Vs− − z) p(dz,ds)
]
+ γ + α , V ∈ C ,
has a unique fixed point.
Proof. We proceed as in Proposition A1 in Duffie and Epstein (1992). Define Z = supt∈T |Xt − Yt|
and Zt = Et [Z] for any X and Y in C. Let Ψ(1) = Ψ and Ψ(n) = Ψ(Ψ(n−1)). Then
|Ψ(X)t −Ψ(Y )t| = 2 γ
∣∣∣∣Et [∫ T
t
(Φ(Ys− + 2 γ Vs−)− Φ(Xs− + 2 γ Vs−)) λs ds
]∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 γ kEt
[∫ T
t
|Xs− − Ys− | λs ds
]
≤ 2 γ k λ¯ (T − t)Et [Z] .
Use Fubini’s theorem for conditional expectations to write∣∣∣Ψ(2)(X)t −Ψ(2)(Y )t∣∣∣ ≤ 2 γ k λ¯Et [∫ T
t
|Ψ(Xs)−Ψ(Ys)| ds
]
≤ 2 γ k λ¯Et
[∫ T
t
2 γ k λ¯ (T − s)Es [Z] ds
]
≤ (2 γ k λ¯)2 Et [∫ T
t
(T − s)Es [Z] ds
]
≤ (2 γ k λ¯)2 (T − t)2
2!
Et [Z] ,
which after n iterations becomes∣∣∣Ψ(n)(X)t −Ψ(n)(Y )t∣∣∣ ≤ (2 γ k λ¯)n (T − t)n
n!
Et [Z] .
Finally,
E
[
sup
t∈T
∣∣∣Ψ(n)(X)t −Ψ(n)(Y )t∣∣∣] ≤ (2 γ k λ¯ T )n
n!
E
[
sup
t∈T
Et [Z]
]
≤ 4
(
2 γ k λ¯ T
)n
n!
E
[
sup
t∈T
|Xt − Yt|
]
.
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Therefore, for n sufficiently large, the function Ψ(n) is a contraction mapping in the Banach space
C equipped with the supremum norm (C, ‖·‖∞). Thus, there exists a unique3 process U ∈ C such
that Ψ(n)(U) = U and because Ψ(n)(Ψ(U)) = Ψ
(
Ψ(n)((U))
)
= Ψ(U) and by uniqueness of the
fixed point, we have Ψ(U) = U , which proves the existence of the fixed point for Ψ. Uniqueness
of this fixed point for Ψ follows from uniqueness of the fixed point in Ψ(n), which concludes the
proof.
The next theorem shows the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the forward part of
the FBSDE (17).
Theorem 3. Fix U ∈ C. Let the distribution function Φ be Lipschitz with constant k, and let λ¯ be
the upper bound of the stochastic intensity λ in Assumption 1. The functional Θ : C → C given by
Θ(V )t =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(Us− + 2 γ Vs− − z) p(dz, ds) , U ∈ C,
has a unique fixed point.
Proof. First we prove that Θ is a functional from C to C. Let U, V ∈ C. By definition, the function
Θ(V ) is adapted and because G ≤ 1 we have
E
[
sup
t∈T
|Θ(V )t|
]
≤ E [p ([0, T ],R)] <∞ .
Thus, Θ(V ) ∈ C. Next, denote Θn = Θ(Θn−1) with Θ0 = Θ(0) and define hn : [0, T ]→ R as
hn(t) = E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣Θ(n+1)s −Θ(n)s ∣∣∣] .
We find an upper bound for hn(t) as follows:
hn(t) = E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣Θ(n+1)s −Θ(n)s ∣∣∣]
= E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣∣∫ s
0
∫
R
(
G
(
Uu− + 2 γΘ
(n)
u− − z
)
−G
(
Uu− + 2 γΘ
(n−1)
u− − z
))
p(dz,du)
∣∣∣∣]
≤ E
[∫ t
0
∫
R
∣∣∣G(Uu− + 2 γΘ(n)u− − z)−G(Uu− + 2 γΘ(n−1)u− − z)∣∣∣ p˜(dz,du)]
= E
[∫ t
0
∣∣∣Φ(Uu− + 2 γΘ(n)u−)− Φ(Uu− + 2 γΘ(n−1)u− )∣∣∣ λt dt]
≤ 2 γ k λ¯E
[∫ t
0
∣∣∣Θ(n)u− −Θ(n−1)u− ∣∣∣ dt]
≤ 2 γ k λ¯
∫ t
0
hn(s) ds .
3Unique in the sense of indistinguishability.
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The above inequality, together with the observation that h0(T ) = M <∞, implies
0 ≤ hn(T ) ≤
M
(
2 γ k λ¯
)n
Tn
n!
,
and use Markov’s inequality to obtain the bound:
P
(
sup
t∈T
∣∣∣Θ(n+1)t −Θ(n)t ∣∣∣ ≥ 2−n) ≤ M (2 γ k λ¯)n Tn 22nn! n→∞−−−→ 0.
By Borel-Cantelli arguments, there is O ⊂ Ω such that for all ω ∈ O the functions t → Θ(n)t (w)
form a Cauchy sequence in the supremum norm of C with probability one. Thus, ∀ω ∈ O there is
a function Θ∗t (ω) such that Θ
(n)
t (ω) converges uniformly to Θ
∗
t (ω) in T. Furthermore, there is an
adapted modification of Θ∗ in Ω.
Thus, the process Θ∗ is a fixed point of the mapping defined by Θ, and therefore satisfies the
forward part of the FBSDE.
Finally, the next theorem shows the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the FBSDE
(17).
Theorem 4. Let the cumulative distribution function Φ be Lipchitz with parameter k such that
k T λ¯ (max{1 , 2 γ})2 < 1 ,
where λ¯ is the upper bound of the stochastic intensity λ in Assumption 1. There exists a unique
solution to the FBSDE
δ˜t = 2 γ Et
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δ˜s− + 2 γ D
δ˜
s− − z) p(dz, ds)
]
+ γ + α , (19a)
Dδ˜t =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(δ˜s− + 2 γ D
δ˜
s− − z) p(dz, ds) , Dδ˜0 = 0 . (19b)
Proof. Consider the functional Υ : C×C → C×C defined in (18). By Corollary 1, C×C is a Banach
space when equipped with the norm
‖Υ(U, V )‖C×C = ‖H(U, V )‖C + ‖I(U, V )‖C , where ‖U‖C = E
[∫ T
0
|Us| ds
]
.
Let (U, V ) and (X,Y ) be in C × C and write
‖Υ(U, V )−Υ(X,Y )‖C×C = E
[∫ T
0
|H(U, V )t −H(X,Y )t|dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
|I(U, V )t − I(X,Y )t|dt
]
. (20)
The first term on the right-hand side of (20) satisfies the bound
E
[∫ T
0
|H(U, V )t −H(X,Y )t| dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
2 γ Et
[∫ T
t
|Φ(Us− + 2 γ Vs−)− Φ(Xs− + 2 γ Ys−)| dAs
]
dt
]
≤ 2 k γ λ¯
∫ T
0
E
[∫ T
t
|Us− + 2 γ Vs− −Xs− − 2 γ Ys− | ds
]
dt .
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The second term on the right-hand side of (20) satisfies the bound
E
[∫ T
0
|I(U, V )t − I(X,Y )t|dt
]
≤
∫ T
0
E
[∫ t
0
∫
R
|G(Us− + 2 γ Vs− − z)−G(Xs− + 2 γ Ys− − z) | p˜(dz, ds)
]
dt
=
∫ T
0
E
[∫ t
0
|Φ(Us− + 2 γ Vs−)− Φ(Xs− + 2 γ Ys−) | λs ds
]
dt
≤ k λ¯
∫ T
0
E
[∫ t
0
|Us− + 2 γ Vs− −Xs− − 2 γ Ys− |ds
]
dt .
Now, let k1 = k λ¯ max{2 γ, 1} and k2 = k1 max{2 γ, 1}, and write
‖Υ(U, V )−Υ(X,Y )‖C×C ≤ k1
∫ T
0
E
[∫ T
0
|Us− + 2 γ Vs− −Xs− − 2 γ Ys− |ds
]
dt
≤ k1 T E
[∫ T
0
|Ut− + 2 γ Vt− −Xt− − 2 γ Yt− |dt
]
≤ k2 T E
[∫ T
0
|Ut− −Xt− |dt
]
+ k2 T E
[∫ T
0
|Vt− − Yt− |dt
]
< ‖(U, V )− (X,Y )‖C×C .
Thus, Υ is a contraction mapping in the Banach space C × C (see Corollary 1), so there exists a
unique pair of processes U∗ and V ∗ such that Υ(U∗, V ∗) = (U∗, V ∗).
In all, we have shown that the candidate optimal control in (12) exists and is unique. Finally,
it is straightforward to see that δ∗ ∈ A. By definition, the control δ∗ is predictable. A short
calculation shows
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(δ∗t )
2
]
≤ E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(Et [NT ])2
]
= E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(
Nt +
∫ T
t
λsds
)2]
≤ 2E [N2T ]+ 2T λ¯2 <∞ .
Therefore the control δ∗ satisfying (12) is an element of A.
4. Optimality
In this section we prove that the discretion δ∗ satisfying (12) is the global minimizer of the
agent’s performance criterion J(δ). We prove this in several steps. First, Theorem 5 shows that
the control δ∗ is a local minimum of J(δ). Then, after proving two auxiliary lemmas, Theorem 6
shows that δ∗ is the global minimizer of the performance criterion.
Theorem 5. The control δ∗ satisfying (12) is a local minimum of the agent’s performance criterion
J(δ).
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Proof. Recall that the Gaˆteaux derivative 〈D J(δ∗), w〉 vanishes in every direction w ∈ A. The
second Gaˆteaux derivative4 at δ ∈ A in the directions ν, w ∈ A is
〈D2 J(δ), w, ν〉 = E
[∫ T
0
wt νt φ
′
t(δt)
(
δt − 2 γ Et−
[
DδT
]
− γ − α
)
dAt
]
(21a)
+E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)
(
νt + 2 γ Et−
[∫ T
0
φs(δs) νs dAs
])
dAt
]
. (21b)
This Gaˆteaux derivative is non-negative at δ = δ∗ because the expression on the right-hand side of
(21a) is zero at δ = δ∗ and the expression in (21b) is non-negative for every ν, w ∈ A. Therefore,
δ∗ is a local minimum.
Lemma 3. Let δ ∈ A and J(δ) = y0 < ∞. Let λ¯ < ∞ be the bound for the stochastic intensity
λ in Assumption 1, and let N¯ < ∞ be a bound for the number of trade attempts. Assume the
function
rt(x) =
∫ x
−∞
z φt(dz)
is Lipschitz in x uniformly on [0, T ]× Ω, with Lipschitz constant k˜.
Given  > 0, define
η =

2
(
(k˜ + 4 N¯ k) λ¯ T + 2 λ¯2 k T 2
)−1
> 0 , (22)
then, for all w ∈ A such that ‖δ − w‖∞ < η, we have |y0 − J(w)| < .
Proof. Consider w ∈ A s.t. ‖δ − w‖∞ < η. Recall, J = JC + αJLP + γ JQP and observe that
|J(δ)− J(w)| ≤ ∣∣JC(δ)− JC(w)∣∣+ α ∣∣JLP (δ)− JLP (w)∣∣+ γ ∣∣JQP (δ)− JQP (w)∣∣ .
Next, we bound each term on the right-hand side of the inequality. Firstly,
∣∣JC(δ)− JC(w)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣E [∫ T
0
∫
R
z
(
Gˆ(δt − z)− Gˆ(wt − z)
)
φt(dz)λt dt
]∣∣∣∣
≤ k˜E
[∫ T
0
|δt − wt|dAt
]
≤ k˜ λ¯ T E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
.
Secondly,
∣∣JLP (δ)− JLP (w)∣∣ ≤ E [∫ T
0
|Φ(δt)− Φ(wt)| dAt
]
≤ λ¯ k T E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
.
Finally,
∣∣JQP (δ)− JQP (w)∣∣ ≤ Aδ,w + kE [∫ T
0
|δt − wt| dAt
]
≤ Aδ,w + k λ¯ T E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
, (23)
4See Appendix Appendix C for details of the second Gaˆteaux derivative.
14
where
Aδ,w :=
∣∣∣∣E [∫ T
0
∫
R
(
2G(δt − z)Dδt− − 2G(wt − z)Dwt−
)
φt(dz) dAt
]∣∣∣∣ .
Next, we bound the first term on the right-hand side of inequality (23):
Aδ,w ≤
∣∣∣∣E [∫ T
0
∫
R
2G(δt − z)
(
Dδt− −Dwt−
)
φt(dz) dAt
]∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣E [∫ T
0
∫
R
2Dwt− (G(δt − z)−G(wt − z)) φt(dz) dAt
]∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 λ¯E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Dδt− −Dwt−∣∣∣ dt]+ 2 N¯ k λ¯E [∫ T
0
|δt − wt| dt
]
≤ 2 λ¯E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t−
0
∫
R
G(δs − z)−G(ws − z) p(dz, ds)
∣∣∣∣∣ dt
]
+ 2 N¯ k T λ¯E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
≤ 2 λ¯ k
∫ T
0
E
[∫ t−
0
|δs − ws| λtds
]
dt+ 2 N¯ k T λ¯E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
≤ 2 λ¯2 k T 2 E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
+ 2 N¯ k T λ¯E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
= (2 λ¯2 k T 2 + 2 N¯ k T λ¯)E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
.
Hence, ∣∣JQP (δ)− JQP (w)∣∣ ≤ (2 λ¯2 k T 2 + 2 N¯ k T λ¯+ k T λ¯) E [sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
,
and since ‖δ − w‖∞ ≤ η, we have
|J(δ)− J(w)| ≤ ∣∣JC(δ)− JC(w)∣∣+ α ∣∣JLP (δ)− JLP (w)∣∣+ γ ∣∣JQP (δ)− JQP (w)∣∣
≤
(
k˜ λ¯ T + αk λ¯ T + 2 γ λ¯2 k T 2 + k γ T λ¯+ 2 γ N¯ k T λ¯
)
E
[
sup
t∈T
|δt − wt|
]
≤ (z¯ k T λ¯+ 2 λ¯2 k T 2 + 4 k T λ¯) η
=

2
<  ,
where the last equality follows from the choice of η in (22), and the proof is complete.
Before proving the main result of this section, which shows that our candidate control is the
global minimum of the performance criterion J(δ), we prove the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 4. If the functional J(δ) has a global minimum δˆ ∈ A, then
〈D J(δˆ), w〉 ≥ 0 , ∀w ∈ A . (24)
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is wˆ ∈ A such that 〈D J(δˆ), wˆ〉 = ηˆ < 0. Set
 = |ηˆ/2| > 0, and because
ηˆ = lim
→0
J(δˆ +  wˆ)− J(δˆ)

, (25)
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there exists ρ > 0 such that if || < ρ, then∣∣∣∣∣J(δˆ +  wˆ)− J(δˆ) − ηˆ
∣∣∣∣∣ < |ηˆ/2| . (26)
Now, fix ˆ such that 0 < ˆ < ρ, then
J(δˆ + ˆ wˆ)− J(δˆ)
ˆ
< |ηˆ/2|+ ηˆ = ηˆ/2 < 0 . (27)
Therefore,
J(δˆ + ˆ wˆ) < ˆ
ηˆ
2
+ J(δˆ) < J(δˆ) , (28)
and because δˆ, wˆ ∈ A, the control δˆ + ˆ wˆ is in the set A, and by (28), we have the inequality
J(δˆ + ˆ wˆ) < J(δˆ), which contradicts δˆ being a global minimizer.
Theorem 6. Global optimality. If J has a global minimum at δˆ ∈ A, then δˆ = δ∗ a.e. in T×Ω,
with δ∗ solving (12).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the global minimum δˆ ∈ A, but it is not true that
δˆ = δ∗ a.e. in T×Ω, with δ∗ solving (12), i.e., there exists (T, O) ∈ B(T)×FT with L(T)P(O) > 0
such that δˆ 6= δ∗ on T×O. First, by Lemma 4
〈D J(δˆ), w〉 ≥ 0 , ∀w ∈ A , (29)
and because δˆ 6= δ∗ on T×O, there exists wˆ ∈ A such that 〈D J(δˆ), wˆ〉 > 0. Now, take w˜ = −wˆ ∈ A,
then
〈D J(δˆ), w˜〉 = E
[∫ T
0
w˜t φt(δˆt)
(
δˆt − 2 γ Et−
[
DδˆT
]
− α− γ
)
dAt
]
= −E
[∫ T
0
wˆt φt(δˆt)
(
δˆt − 2 γ Et−
[
DδˆT
]
− α− γ
)
dAt
]
= −〈D J(δˆ), wˆ〉
< 0 ,
which contradicts Lemma 4. Therefore, if there is a global minimum at δˆ ∈ A, then δˆ = δ∗ a.e. in
T× Ω.
5. Performance of strategy
The expectation that appears in (12) is conditional on the information Ft− , therefore the
process δ∗ is a sub-martingale. Here, we study a slight variation of the FBSDE in (12) and derive
a partial-integro differential equation for the optimal control.
To this end, fix the optimal control δ∗ ∈ A and define the process (δˇt)t∈T, where
δˇt = 2 γ Et
[
Dδ
∗
T
]
+ γ + α .
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Observe that δ∗ in (12) is the ca`gla`d (LCRL) version of the ca`dla`g (RCLL) process δˇ, and δ∗t = δˇt− .
Define the dynamics of the missed trades Dδ
∗
as a function of the process δˇ:
Dδˇt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(δˇs− − z) p˜(dz,ds) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(δˇs− − z) q(dz, ds) ,
and recall that q = p− p˜ is the compensated random measure of N .
Assumption 2. The stochastic intensity (λt)t∈T has the Markov property, furthermore, the quadratic
co-variation between the process λ and Dδˇ is zero.
By Assumption 2, we derive the Markov property of δˇ, which we use to write δˇt = h(t,D
δˇ
t , λt)
for a differentiable function h with respect to the first argument. Then the process Dδˇ is given by
Dδˇt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(h(s,Dδˇs− , λt)− z) p˜(dz, ds) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
G(h(s,Dδˇs− , λt)− z) q(dz, ds) ,
and because δˇ is a martingale, the function h is the solution of a PIDE that we characterize in the
following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let δˇt = h(t,D
δˇ
t , λt). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the function h satisfies the PIDE
0 = ∂th(t,D, λ) + Lλt h(t,D, λ) +
(∫ ∞
h(t,D,λ)
λφt(z) dz
)
(h(t,D + 1, λ)− h(t,D, λ)) , (30)
with boundary and terminal conditions
lim
D→∞
h(t,D, λ) =∞ and h(T,D, λ) = 2 γ D + γ + α .
Here, Lλt h(t,D, λ) is the infinitesimal generator of the arrival intensity process λ acting on the
function h.
Proof. Apply Itoˆ’s formula to δˇt = h(t,D
δˇ
t , λt) and note that the drift term (i.e., the dt-term)
vanishes because δˇ is a martingale. Existence and uniqueness of a solution to this PIDE follow
from a comparison principle. Specifically, we have
0 = ∂th(t,D, λ) + Lλt h(t,D, λ) +
(∫ ∞
h(t,D,λ)
λt φt(z) dz
)
(h(t,D + 1, λ)− h(t,D, λ))
≤ ∂th(t,D, λ) + Lλt h(t,D, λ) +
(∫ ∞
−∞
λt φt(z) dz
)
(h(t,D + 1, λ)− h(t,D, λ))
= ∂th(t,D, λ) + Lλt h(t,D, λ) + λt (h(t,D + 1, λ)− h(t,D, λ))
≤ ∂th(t,D, λ) + Lλt h(t,D, λ) + λ¯ (h(t,D + 1, λ)− h(t,D, λ)) .
We use the continuity of h in t to write δ∗t = h(t,Dδˇt− , λt−), see characterization for h in (30)
to compute δ∗t = δˇt− .
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Figure 1: Left panel: Optimal strategy δ∗ as a function of time and the number of missed trades for γ = 0.01 (bottom
surface), γ = 0.03 (middle surface), and γ = 0.1 (top surface). The remaining parameters are: λ = 100, α = 0, and
Zn ∼ N(0.2, 1) for every n. Right panel: Optimal strategy for various values of missed trades; blue curves are for
D = 4, green curves are for D = 8, and red curves are for D = 12.
5.1. Poisson arrival of trades
We solve the PIDE in (30) numerically to illustrate the performance of the latency-optimal
strategy. Assume the agent sends MLOs according to a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity
λ = 100, the linear penalty parameter is α = 0, the quadratic penalty parameter γ takes values in
{0.01, 0.03, 0.1}, the marks (price and quantity shocks to the LOB) are iid normal Zn ∼ N(0.2, 1),
n = 1, 2, . . . , and the trading horizon is T = 1.
Figure 1 shows the discretion δ∗ as a function of the number of missed trades. The left panel
shows three surfaces, one for each value of the quadratic penalty parameter γ. The higher the
value of the quadratic penalty parameter for missing trades, the higher is the optimal discretion
employed in the strategy. The right panel shows the optimal discretion when the number of missed
trades is Dδ
∗ ∈ {4, 8, 12}, and the quadratic penalty parameter is γ ∈ {0.01, 0.03, 0.1}. Blue
denotes cases with γ = 0.01, green for γ = 0.03, and red for γ = 0.1. Solid lines are for Dδ
∗
= 4,
dashed lines are for Dδ
∗
= 8, and dash-dotted lines are for Dδ
∗
= 12.
We perform 10,000 simulations of the agent’s trading activity and Figure 2 shows three sample
paths. The top panel shows the optimal discretion of the agent’s orders and the cumulative costs
accrued from walking the book and from receiving price improvements. The bottom panel shows
the number of missed trades and the number of trade attempts. Clearly, as the number of missed
trades increases (decreases), the optimal strategy is to increase (decrease) the discretion of the
MLOs to walk the LOB.
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Figure 2: Sample paths for the optimal discretion δ∗ (top left panel), number of missed trades Dδ
∗
(lower left panel),
cost of strategy Cδ
∗
(top right panel), and number of trade attempts N (lower right panel) for three simulations of
the MPP. Parameters: α = 0, γ = 0.07, λ = 100, T = 1.
Figure 3 reports various cost metrics of the optimal strategy for three values of the quadratic
penalty parameter γ. The top panel shows histograms of the cost incurred by the strategy to fill
trades, i.e., Cδ
∗
T , and the average cost of walking the LOB to fill trades, i.e., C
δ∗
T /(NT − Dδ
∗
T ).
Recall that the cost is negative (positive) when the trade is executed with price improvement
(deterioration). The Figure shows that as the value of the quadratic penalty parameter increases:
(i) the average cost of walking the book to fill trades increases, the total cost increases, and the
average number of misses decreases, see bottom panels; (ii) the costs of walking the LOB increase
because the strategy fills more orders (i.e., misses fewer trades), see the bottom-left panel. The
bottom-right panel shows that the average ratio of missed trades to trade attempts decreases when
the penalty for missing trades increases.
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Figure 3: Top left panel: Histogram of the cost Cδ
∗
T of the strategy. Top right panel: Histogram of the extra cost
per filled trade Cδ
∗
T /(NT −Dδ
∗
T ). Bottom left panel: Histogram of the number of misses D
δ∗
T . Bottom right panel:
Histogram of percentage of misses Dδ
∗
T /NT .
The tradeoff between higher fill ratios and costs of walking the book are clear. An agent who
seeks very high fill ratios, i.e., high values of (NT−Dδ∗T )/NT , employs very high values of the penalty
parameters in the performance criterion. Other agents may prefer to swap price improvements for
price deteriorations in their overall trading strategy. For example, in the 10,000 simulations we
discuss, when γ ≈ 0.0693 the average cost of filled trades, Cδ∗T /(NT −Dδ
∗
T ), is zero and the average
rate of missed trades, Dδ
∗
T /NT is 0.1048.
Finally, a naive strategy employed by liquidity takers is to send MLOs with no discretion to
walk the LOB, see Cartea and Sa´nchez-Betancourt (2018). Here, the expected ratio of missed
trades to number of attempts and the expected cost of the strategy for an agent who sends all
MLOs with no discretion to walk the LOB is E[D0T /NT ] = 0.5797 and E[C0T ] = −29.25, respectively.
The expected cost is negative because the strategy does not accrue costs from walking the book,
but may receive price improvements.
5.1.1. Optimal vs fixed discretion to walk the LOB
We compare the results of a strategy with α = 0 and γ > 0 with those of a fixed discretion
latency-optimal strategy (i.e., α > 0 and γ = 0). Recall that when γ = 0 the optimal strategy is
independent of the number of misses, so the agent sends all MLOs with discretion δ∗ = α, see (14).
The top panels in Figure 4 show the probability that the number of missed trades is less than
10% of trade attempts, i.e., P[Dδ∗T < 0.1NT ], and the expected cost of the strategy, i.e., E[Cδ
∗
T ],
when the agent sends orders with a fixed discretion to walk the LOB, i.e., γ = 0 and α ∈ [0, 2.5].
Similarly, the bottom panels show the probability that the number of missed trades is less than
10% of trade attempts, i.e., P[Dδ∗T < 0.1NT ] and the expected cost of the strategy, i.e., E[Cδ
∗
T ] for
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γ ∈ [0.02, 0.16] and α = 0. The orange circle in each picture shows the lowest expected terminal
cost E[Cδ∗T ] for which P[Dδ
∗
T < 0.1NT ] ≥ 0.95. The expected terminal cost of the fixed discretion
latency-optimal strategy with α = 1.91 is approximately 9.52, and the expected cost obtained with
the latency-optimal strategy, with γ = 0.127, is approximately 5.93.
Also, the expected number of misses when γ = 0 and α = 1.9125 (orange circle point in the
top panels) is E
[
Dδ
∗
T
]
= 6.39, and when α = 0 and γ = 0.1220 (orange circle point in the bottom
panels) we obtain E
[
Dδ
∗
T
]
= 5.41.
Thus, an agent who does not expect to miss more than 10% of the trades with high probability
may prefer a latency-optimal optimal strategy with γ > 0 and α = 0 than a strategy that sends
MLOs with a fixed discretion during the entire trading window.
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Figure 4: Top panel shows P(Dδ
∗
T < 0.1NT ) and E[Cδ
∗
T ] when γ = 0 and for α ∈ [0, 2.5], recall that δ∗ = α when
γ = 0, see (14). Similarly, bottom panel shows P(Dδ
∗
T < 0.1NT ) and E[Cδ
∗
T ] when α = 0 and γ ∈ [0.02, 0.16]. In all
pictures, the orange circle marks the lowest value of E [CT ] when P (DT < 0.1NT ) ≥ 0.99. Other model parameters:
λ = 100, α = 0, and Z ∼ N(0.2, 1) for all trades.
5.2. Pinned arrival rates
In this section, we assume the arrival intensity of the agent’s MLOs is
λ?t =
M −Nt−
T − t+  , (31)
where M > 0 is a positive integer,  > 0 and recall that Nt denotes the number of trade attempts.
The intensity λ?t is bounded by λ¯ = M/, which is a condition we require in the latency-optimal
strategy we derived above, and if  = 0, the intensity guarantees that NT = M , see Conforti (2016)
and Hoyle (2010).
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Now, use the Markov property of δ∗ to write δ∗ = h(t,Dt− , Nt−), where the function h satisfies
the PIDE
0 = ∂th(t,D,N) +
(∫ ∞
h(t,D,N)
M −N
T − t+  φt(z) dz
)
(h(t,D + 1, N + 1)− h(t,D,N))
+
(∫ h(t,D,N)
−∞
M −N
T − t+  φt(z) dz
)
(h(t,D,N + 1)− h(t,D,N)) ,
with
h(t,D,M) = 2 γ D + γ + α and h(T,D,N) = 2 γ D + γ + α .
Figure 5 shows the optimal discretion to walk the LOB for various values of missed trades and
target number of trades M = 100. The interpretation is similar to that of Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Optimal strategy δ∗ for various values of γ, number of misses, and number of attempts. From left to right,
penalty parameter is γ = 0.01, γ = 0.03, and γ = 0.1. Dotted line Nt = 30, solid line Nt = 60, and dot-dash line
Nt = 90. Blue lines D
δ∗
t = 4, green lines D
δ∗
t = 8, red lines D
δ∗
t = 12. The remaining parameters are: M = 100,
α = 0,  = 0.1, Z ∼ N(0.2, 1).
We perform 10,000 simulations with the same parameters as above and use the arrival rate
of the MLOs as in (31) with  = 0.1. Figures 6 and 7 report the results, which have a similar
interpretation to that of Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
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Figure 6: Sample paths for the optimal discretion δ∗ (top left panel), number of missed trades Dδ
∗
(lower left panel),
cost of strategy Cδ
∗
(top right panel), and number of trade attempts N (lower right panel) for three simulations of
the MPP. Parameters: α = 0, γ = 0.07,  = 0.1, M = 100, T = 1.
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Figure 7: Top left panel: Histogram of the cost Cδ
∗
T of the strategy. Top right panel: Histogram of the extra cost
per filled trade Cδ
∗
T /(NT −Dδ
∗
T ). Bottom left panel: Histogram of the number of misses D
δ∗
T . Bottom right panel:
Histogram of percentage of misses Dδ
∗
T /NT .
6. Conclusions
With few exceptions, the literature on algorithmic trading assumes that latency in the market-
place is zero. This is not accurate, and the effects of latency on the efficacy of liquidity making
and taking strategies are economically significant. In this paper we proposed a model to improve
the marksmanship of the orders sent by liquidity takers when, due to latency, the limit order book
is a moving target.
We showed how a liquidity taker chooses the price limit of marketable orders when there
is latency in the marketplace. The optimal strategy balances the tradeoff between the costs of
walking the book and the number of missed trades over a trading horizon. We modelled the effects
of latency as a marked point process that captures the interaction between liquidity taking orders
and the limit orders resting in the book. We characterized the optimal price limit of marketable
orders as a solution to a FBSDE, which, to the best of our knowledge, is new and, as the extant
literature does not have uniqueness and existence results, we prove both.
The strategy developed here may be implemented as another layer of any liquidity taking
strategy (especially those that follow a stochastic trading schedule) that incorrectly assumes zero
latency. Our framework can be applied in other contexts too. In its most general form, we solve a
problem in which the agent decides how much she is willing to pay to absorb a stochastic shock to
achieve an objective or complete a task. For example, market makers in foreign exchange markets
with ‘last look’ can employ the framework developed in this paper. The last look feature allows
liquidity makers to reject trades, so they are not picked off by faster liquidity taking traders,
24
see Oomen (2017) and Cartea et al. (2018). Specifically, with our framework, a foreign exchange
market maker can obtain the optimal tolerance that maximizes the number of incoming marketable
orders she is willing to fill while minimizing losses to the fast traders who snipe her stale quotes in
the LOB.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma in three parts. First we work out the Gaˆteaux derivative of the cost function. We
use (8) to write
1

{
E
[
Cδ+wT
]− E [CδT ]} = 1
{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
z
(
Gˆ(δt + wt − z)− Gˆ(δt − z)
)
φt(dz) dAt
]}
=
1

{
E
[∫ T
0
∫ δt+wt
δt
z φt(dz) dAt
]}
= E
[∫ T
0
1

{∫ δt+wt
δt
z φt(dz)
}
dAt
]
.
Then, by the dominated convergence theorem and the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have
〈D JC(δ), w〉 = lim
→0
JC(δ + w)− JC(δ)

= lim
→0
1

{
E
[
Cδ+wT
]− E [CδT ]} = E
[∫ T
0
δt wt φt(δt) dAt
]
.
Next we work out the Gaˆteaux derivative of the linear penalty. Note that
1

{
E
[
Dδ+wT
]− E [DδT ]} = 1
{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)) p˜(dz, dt)
]}
= E
[∫ T
0
1

{∫ δt
δt+wt
φt(dz)
}
dAt
]
,
therefore, we have
lim
→0
1

{
E
[
Dδ+wT
]− E [DδT ]} = −E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt) dAt
]
.
Finally, we work out the Gaˆteaux derivative of the quadratic penalty. We write
1

{
E
[(
Dδ+wT
)2]− E [(DδT )2]
}
=
2

{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
Dδ+wt− G(δt + wt − z) p˜(dz, dt)
]
− E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
Dδt− G(δt − z) p˜(dz, dt)
]}
+
1

{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z) p˜(dz, dt)
]}
.
Subtract and add
2

{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
Dδ+wt− G(δt − z) p˜(dz, dt)
]}
26
to the right-hand side of the equation above and write
1

{
E
[(
Dδ+wT
)2]− E [(DδT )2]
}
=
2

{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
Dδ+wt− G(δt + wt − z)−Dδ+wt− G(δt − z)
)
p˜(dz, dt)
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
Dδ+wt− G(δt − z)−Dδt− G(δt − z)
)
p˜(dz, dt)
]}
+
1

{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)) p˜(dz, dt)
]}
= 2
{
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
Dδ+wt−
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

)
p˜(dz, dt)
]
(QP1)
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
Dδ+wt− −Dδt−

G(δt − z)
)
p˜(dz, dt)
]}
(QP2)
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

)
p˜(dz, dt)
]
. (QP3)
Next, take the limit of QP1, QP2, and QP3 as  approaches zero. The limit of QP1 is given by
lim
→0
QP1 = lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
Dδ+wt−
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

p˜(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
Dδ+wt−
1

{∫ δt
δt+wt
φt(dz)
}
dAt
]
= −E
[∫ T
0
Dδt− wt φt(δt) dAt
]
.
The last equality follows from the dominated convergence theorem and because lim→0Dδ+wt− = D
δ
t− almost
surely.
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The limit of QP2 is given by
lim
→0
QP2
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
Dδ+wt− −Dδt−

G(δt − z) p˜(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt − z)
(∫ t−
0
∫
R
G(δs + ws − z′)−G(δs − z′)

p(dz′, ds)
)
p˜(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

(∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z) p˜(dz′, ds)
)
p(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z) p˜(dz′, ds)
]
p(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z) p˜(dz′, ds)
]
p˜(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
1

∫ δt
δt+wt
φt(dz)Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z) p˜(dz′, ds)
]
dAt
]
= −E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)Et−
[∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z) p˜(dz′, ds)
]
dAt
]
.
Finally, the limit of QP3 is given by
lim
→0
QP3 = lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
G(δt + wt − z)−G(δt − z)

p˜(dz, dt)
]
= lim
→0
E
[∫ T
0
1

∫ δt
δt+wt
φt(dz) dAt
]
= −E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt) dAt
]
,
which concludes the proof.
Appendix B. Bounded Gaˆteaux derivative
Let S = max{1, {φt(z)}0≤t≤T ,z∈R} < ∞ and δ, w ∈ A. Let ηt = max{δt, wt, Nt−}, which is pre-
dictable because each process is predictable, and note that E
[
sup0≤t≤T (ηt)
2
] ≤ 4E [sup0≤t≤T (δt)2] +
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4E
[
sup0≤t≤T (wt)
2
]
+ 4E
[
sup0≤t≤T (Nt−)
2
]
<∞. Then
|〈D J(δ), w〉| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
0
δt wt φt(δt) dAt
]∣∣∣∣∣+ 2 γ
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
0
φt(δt)wt
(∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z′)p˜(dz′, ds)
)
dAt
]∣∣∣∣∣
2 γ
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
0
φt(δt)wtD
δ
t− dAt
]∣∣∣∣∣+ (γ + α)
∣∣∣∣∣E
[∫ T
0
φt(δt)wt dAt
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ S λ¯ T E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(ηt)
2
]
+ 2 γ S T 2 λ¯E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|ηt|
]
+2 γ S T λ¯E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(ηt)
2
]
+ (γ + λ)S T E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|ηt|
]
< ∞ .
Appendix C. Second Gaˆteaux derivative
The first Gaˆteaux derivative of the functional J is given by
〈D J(δ), w〉 = E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)
(
δt − 2 γ
(∫ T
t
∫
R
G(δs − z′) p˜(dz′, ds)
)
− 2 γ Dδt− − (γ + α)
)
dAt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)
(
δt − 2 γ Et−
[
DδT
]− (γ + α)) dAt] .
Let δ, w, ν ∈ A. The second Gaˆteaux derivative of J(δ) in the directions w and ν, is defined as
〈D2 J(δ), w, ν〉 = lim
→0
〈D J(δ +  ν), w〉 − 〈D J(δ), w〉

,
which converges to
〈D2 J(δ), w, ν〉 = E
[∫ T
0
wt νt φ
′
t(δt)
(
δt − 2 γ Et−
[
DδT
]− γ − α) dAt]
+E
[∫ T
0
wt φt(δt)
(
νt + 2 γ Et−
[∫ T
0
φs(δs) νs dAs
])
dAt
]
.
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